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Abstract
We present a model of optimal government policy when policy choices may
exacerbate socio-political instability (SPI). We show that optimal policy that
takes into account SPI transforms a standard concave growth model into a
model with both a poverty trap and endogenous growth. The resulting equi-
librium dynamics inherit the properties of government policies and need not
be monotone. Indeed, for a broad set of conditions we demonstrate that gov-
ernment policy is unable to eliminate the poverty trap; when these conditions
do not hold, “most” countries eventually reach a balanced growth path. The
predictions of the model are tested by developing three new measures of SPI for
a panel of 58 countries. Estimating optimal policies and the growth equation
derived from the model reveals strong support for the theory. In particular,
we show via simulations that optimal funding for public investment and the
police cause a typical developing economy to expand on a quasi-linear growth
path, with the baseline level of SPI determining whether growth is positive or
negative.
Keywords: Socio-Political Instability, Endogenous Growth, Public Investment, Po-
litical Economy of Growth
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: P16: Political Econ-
omy of Capitalism; E62: Fiscal Policy; O40: Economic Growth1 Introduction
An extensive theoretical and empirical literature has shown that social upheaval and
political violence hinder economic development (Venieris and Gupta, 1985, 1986;
Venieris and Stewart, 1987; Barro, 1991; Gupta, 1990; Alesina and Perotti, 1996;
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel, 1996; Zak, 2000, in press). The notion that socio-
political instability (SPI) aﬀects economic performance can be traced to Haavelmo
(1954) and Adam Smith (1776). In this paper, we characterize optimal government
policies to stimulate economic development when policies raise output but may ex-
acerbate instability. Optimal policies are then embedded in a general equilibrium
growth model to examine the resulting development paths.
SPI arises when the political system is unable or unwilling to mediate disputes
over the distribution of income (Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Feng, Kugler and Zak,
2000).1 Barro (2000, p7) writes “Inequality of wealth and income motivates the poor
to engage in crime, riots, and other disruptive activities.” Violent demonstrations
materially reduce countries’ resources, inhibiting development potentials. Because
most developing countries have underdeveloped polities that are unable to eﬀectively
resolve distributional disputes (Feng, 1997), SPI is endemic. As a result, governments
have an interest in designing policies that can counteract SPI and at the same time
stimulate income growth.
The model in this paper demonstrates that the interplay between the marginal
eﬃciency of the police at quelling SPI and the marginal sensitivity of SPI to changes
in the income distribution determine a country’s growth trajectory. While we ﬁnd
that optimal policy can lead to endogenous growth, this outcome is not guaranteed;
a poverty trap exists in the model, and conditions are derived under which optimal
policy is insuﬃcient to permit the economy to escape from poverty.
1On income distribution and development, see Fields (2000), Forbes (2000), and the seminal work
by Kuznets (1955, 1963).Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 3
After presenting the model in Section 2, we generate three measures of SPI in
Section 3 in order to test the model empirically. In Section 4, we estimate the derived
optimal policies and growth equations. Statistical tests reveal robust support for the
model’s predictions. Further, using the estimated coeﬃcients, we simulate the model’s
equilibrium dynamics. These simulations show that optimal government policies for
a typical developing country generate a quasi-linear growth path. If baseline SPI
is not too high, an economy with optimal policies exhibits near AK growth in the
transitional dynamics and balanced growth in the limit; if baseline SPI is beyond
an identiﬁed threshold, the economy’s expansion path remains nearly linear, but the
growth rate is negative, leading the economy into a poverty trap. Lastly, this section
explores several extensions of the model, especially the role of ethnic divisions in
stimulating SPI. Including ethnicity reveals interesting nonlinearities vis-` a-vis SPI.
Section 5 concludes with a review of our ﬁndings.
2 Government Policy and Socio-Political
Instability
SPI reﬂects the myriad coordination failures–both economic and political–that occur
during diﬀerent stages of development.2 Because income growth raises support for
the government (Lewis-Beck, 1990; Fiorina, 1981; Tufte, 1978), it is a goal of nearly
every politician.3 Following a large literature in political science and economics, we
model government policy-makers are being concerned with maintaining themselves
2See Bardhan (1997), Easterly and Levine (1997), Bates (2000), and Zak (2000) for recent dis-
cussions of the sources of political instability.
3McGuire and Olson (1996) show that only predatory autocrats with short time-horizons will set
policies that will cause the economy to contract rather than grow. Institutional conditions under
which this obtains are derived by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2002).Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 4
in power. Government longevity is enhanced when policies are chosen that raise
government resources and bolster support among constituents. A government risks
raising SPI if policy choices do not take into account their eﬀect on income inequality
(Zak, 2000).
Governments monitor violent demonstrations – a component of SPI – as these
reduce the tax base and thereby imperil the government’s ability to implement policies
of all types (Feng, Kugler and Zak, 2000). If SPI suﬃciently weakens the government,
the ruling regime will be overthrown (Zak and Feng, in press; Feng and Zak, 1999).
Thus, the threat of SPI restricts the set of policy choices by the government – even
policies to explicitly to reduce SPI. In sum, government policy choices that stimulate
the economy may also exacerbate inequality and thereby raise SPI. We show below
there exists an optimal policy set that balances these eﬀects.
2.1 The Model
Consider a standard neoclassical growth model with a single good and one accumu-
lable factor, private capital K. The government’s objective is to maximize aggregate
income growth which is equivalent to maximizing capital accumulation. This objec-
tive is consistent with models in which politicians set policy to increases their chances
of re-election (Magee, Brock, and Young, 1989; Arbetman and Kugler, 1995; Alesina,
Roubini, and Cohen, 1997; Ghate, 1999; Ghate and Zak, 2002), an approach that
has substantial empirical support (Lewis-Beck, 1990). This goal is realized via two
policy instruments: public investment, λ, and police expenditures, P. Policies are
funded by a lump-sum tax, τ, and for simplicity, population in the model is constant
and normalized to unity. Although government policies can enhance growth, taxes
reduce income and thus capital accumulation. Lump-sum taxes are also regressiveOptimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 5
which magniﬁes income inequality.4
In each period, a fraction π of output is destroyed by SPI, with πt(Pt,ψ(τt)) :
IR
+ × IR
+ → [0,1], where ψ ≥ 1 is income inequality. When ψ = 1 there is perfect
equality, while ψ>1 measures the degree of income inequality. The theoretical and
empirical literature on SPI robustly shows that inequality raises SPI (e.g. Venieris and
Gupta, 1985, 1986; Alesina et al, 1996; Zak, 2000, in press) which we assume holds in
the economy being modeled, ∂π
∂ψ > 0.5 Since taxes are regressive, a tax increase raises
inequality,
∂ψ
∂τ > 0. For simplicity, we model inequality as increasing linearly in taxes,
ψ(τt)=τt. Police expenditures have the opposite eﬀect, reducing SPI by making it
more diﬃcult for demonstrators to destroy output during demonstrations, ∂π
∂P < 0.6
Police expenditures, P, indirectly raise growth by preventing the destruction of
output, while the second policy instrument, public investment, λ, directly raises out-
put by complementing private capital in production. Output is produced using a
Cobb-Douglas production function, Y = Kαλ1−α with α ∈ (0,1), and, as in Barro
(1990), public investment does not accumulate. As our purpose is to characterize
the aggregate dynamics induced by ﬁscal policy choices, we concretize the model by
choosing a functional form for π,
4Many types of taxes are equivalent to lump-sum taxes. For example, a proportional tax on labor
income when labor supply is indivisible (e.g. with a 40 hour work week) is equivalent to a lump-sum
tax.
5We examine a more extensive set of determinants of SPI in Section 4.5.
6We model SPI as strictly decreasing in police expenditures even though Gupta, Singh, and
Sprague (1993) show that high levels of police expenditures exacerbate SPI. This simpliﬁcation is
warranted since an optimizing government would never fund the police to such an extent that it
raised SPI. Further, anti-SPI policy is not “repressive” in that the government’s objective in the
model is income growth which constrains the use of force (on government repression, see Bueno de
Mesquita et al, 2002). Note, though, that our empirics (Section 4) include these possibilities, and






where η>0, is the sensitivity of SPI to changes in income inequality, and ω>0i s
the productivity of the police at reducing SPI. The constant D is restricted to keep
(1) well-deﬁned, D ∈ (0,P−ωτη], with related restrictions on government policies,
τ,λ,P ≥ 1.7 The value 1 − D is the baseline level of SPI absent government policy
(i.e. when P = τ =1 ) .
Optimal policy for the government is the solution to a modiﬁed planning problem






Kt+1 = s[(1 − π)Yt − τt]+( 1− δ)Kt (3)
τt = λt + Pt, (4)
where π is deﬁned in (1). Equation (3) is the standard stock accounting relation
for capital accumulation with δ ∈ [0,1] the depreciation rate. Because development
policy is dynamic, choices depend on the rate of capital accumulation. We use the
7Minimum funding levels for P,λ, and the level of taxes, τ can be thought of as maintaining
minimal institutions that specify the rules of exchange, without which economic transactions will
not be undertaken. Our goal is not to model the sources of SPI, but how governments react to
reduce SPI, thus, we need only specify the way in which SPI aﬀects the government’s objective.
Since π depends on endogenous variables, τ,λ,a n dP, the solution to the government’s problem is
well-deﬁned and depends on the factors aﬀecting π.
8Ghate and Zak (1999) prove that, absent externalities, maximizing capital deepening is equiva-
lent to a standard representative agent Pareto allocation problem. The advantages of this approach
are that a social welfare function need not be deﬁned, and that the objective is consistent with
politicians’ agendas.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 7
Solow (1956) assumption that a constant proportion s ∈ (0,1) of income is saved.9
Savings in (3) are a proportion of income net of SPI and net of taxes, τ.E q u a t i o n
(4) is the government budget constraint in which tax revenue, τ, funds expenditures
on the police, P, and public investment, λ.
Using the functional forms for production and SPI, the optimal government poli-

























where A ≡ [D(1 −α)1−ω+η(1 −α +ω)−η−1ωω(1 −α +ω −η)]
1
α+η−ω. For this solution
to be well-deﬁned, we impose the regularity condition
Assumption 1 (A1): 1 >α+ η − ω>0.
We will consider condition A1 to be satisﬁed throughout. Note that income levels
aﬀect SPI. As shown both theoretically and empirically by Zak (in press), as income
falls, the opportunity cost of engaging in SPI also falls and, as a result, SPI rises.
In the model here, SPI depends on income through its dependence on the capital
stock K, i.e. optimal policies P  (Kt)a n dτ (Kt) are state-dependent. Indeed, it is
straightforward to show that as long as ω>ηthen ∂π
∂K < 0; i.e. if SPI is more sensitive
to a change in police expenditures than to a change in inequality, then when capital
(income) falls, SPI rises. Under this assumption, the model matches the relationship
between income and SPI found in the data.
The next result characterizes optimal government policies.
9Blinder and Deaton (1985) ﬁnd robust support showing that savings is proportional to income;
see also Deaton (1992).Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 8
Proposition 1 Optimal policies {λ 
t,P 
t ,τ 
t } are convex in K if ω>η ;a r el i n e a ri n
K if ω = η; and are concave in K if ω<η .
Proposition 1 shows that the interplay between the marginal eﬃciency of the police at
suppressing SPI, ω, and the sensitivity of SPI to income equality, η, determines how
optimal policies evolve during development.10 Countries with eﬃcient police forces
optimally increase policy funding rapidly with growth in the capital stock, while
ineﬃcient police forces lead to optimal policies that increase slowly with growth.
Equivalently, countries in which instability is highly sensitive to income inequality
have optimal policies that grow more slowly than capital.
Observe that the ratio of expenditures on public investment to police expenditures
is constant as the economy grows, and equals the ratio of the marginal products of





ω . Thus, government policies
remain in balance in the transitional dynamics until, as shown below, a threshold is
reached after which public investment continues to grow while police expenditures
remain constant.
Next, we embed optimal policies into the capital market equilibrium condition to










t − τt]+( 1− δ)Kt. (8)
Replacing the government policy instruments in (8) with optimal policies λ 
t, P  
t ,a n d
τ 




t +( 1− δ)Kt, (9)
where B ≡ D(1−α)η−ωωω(1 −α + ω)−ηAω−η+1−α −(1 −α + ω)(1−α)−1A,w h i c hi s
strictly positive under A1.
10The proofs of the propositions are straightforward and are not reported to save space.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 9
Corollary 1 demonstrates that economy (9) inherits the growth properties of op-
timal policies.
Corollary 1 The economy’s growth path is convex if ω>η ;i sl i n e a ri fω = η;a n d
is concave if ω<η .
Further, endogenous growth obtains if SPI is insensitive to inequality relative to the







If initial capital is less than the threshold, K0 < K, then investment net of tax and
SPI is insuﬃcient to sustain positive growth when ω>ηand the economy contracts
permanently. This occurs because a shortage of tax revenue results in policies that
are insuﬃcient to both combat SPI and stimulate growth.
There are two other growth paths in this economy as identiﬁed in Corollary 1, one
with concave policies which obtains when SPI increases rapidly in income inequality,
η>ω , producing concave growth to a steady state; the other is the knife-edge case
when η = ω which produces an AK model where the economy grows endogenously at
a constant rate sB − δ +1. 11 Figure 1 depicts all three growth paths that the model
admits.
[Figure 1 here]
The next result shows that regardless of government policies, countries may be
caught in a poverty trap.
Proposition 2 There is a baseline value of SPI, π =1−D, such that if π>π then
the economy is caught in a poverty trap even when government sets policy optimally.
11As long as sB > δ, the economy grows rather than contracts.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 10
This proposition demonstrates that if underlying SPI is suﬃciently high, government
policy is an insuﬃcient lever to move the economy out of a poverty trap. When the
growth path is convex (ω>η )a n dπ>π, the area of attraction to the poverty trap
at the origin under Proposition 2 includes the entire real line so that positive growth
is unattainable for any initial condition (i.e. K →∞ ). This is a disturbing result
since convex government policies are the most eﬀective at stimulating growth. Thus,
even with the most eﬀective government policy, suﬃciently high baseline SPI causes
an economy to be permanently trapped in poverty. When the economy’s growth path
is concave (η>ω ), the steady state merges to the origin if π>π, also resulting in a
global poverty trap. In the case of linear growth (η = ω), an increase in baseline SPI
shifts the growth path below the 45 degree line so that for any initial level of capital,
the economy contracts to the origin.
The results above show that baseline SPI and the amount of initial capital sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect an economy’s growth prospects. Thus, we have shown that SPI not
only aﬀects savings and output as in Venieris et al, and Barro, but fundamentally
determines whether growth is possible at all, even when the government sets policy op-
timally. This result obtains because policy-makers are myopic in that they maximize
period-to-period growth, rather than the entire sequence of capital stock. Politicians’
myopia arises because they focus on the upcoming election when setting policy, i.e.
a “period” is an election cycle.
In an economy that is growing (i.e. π<π), in the limit SPI vanishes. Speciﬁcally,
when Kt ≥ [( 1
D)ωω(1−α)η−ω(1−α+ω)ηAη−ω]
α+η−ω
α(ω−η) ≡ κ,t h e nπ =0 .W i t hc o n t i n u e d
growth, the government simply funds the police at the ﬁxed rate P(κ) and uses all
the remaining tax revenue for public investment.
We show in the Appendix that for growing economies with Kt >κ ,o p t i m a l
policy produces an economy with endogenous balanced growth. The exception to
this scenario occurs for countries with concave growth paths for which steady stateOptimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 11
capital is less than the no-SPI capital stock κ. For initial capital less than the steady
state, these countries are caught at a “middle-income trap,” as they reach a steady
state with positive levels of SPI but are unable to reach the balanced growth path.
Thus, developing countries with suﬃciently low baseline SPI to escape a poverty
trap typically grow rapidly in the transitional dynamics, and then exhibit long-run
balanced growth. Put diﬀerently, the model predicts that SPI is less important in
developed countries than in developing ones.
As baseline SPI rises, but does not exceed the poverty trap threshold, (0 <π<π),
a higher value of initial capital is required to obtain endogenous growth in convex
economies. In addition, as π rises but remains below π, the rate of convergence to the
balanced growth path is retarded. Nevertheless, barring external events, countries
with convex growth that do not begin too poor (K0 > K) and in which baseline SPI
is not too high (π<π), eventually reach a balanced growth path. Countries with
concave growth are less likely to reach the balanced growth path as baseline SPI rises.
2.2 Testable Implications of the Model
The model of growth with optimal policy-setting generates four testable implications:
i) optimal police and public investment expenditures are increasing and log-linear in
capital, by equations (5) and (6);
ii) by Corollary 1, output growth is convex, linear, or concave if the marginal impact
of police expenditures, ω, exceeds, equals, or is less than, the marginal sensitivity of
SPI to income inequality, η, respectively;
iii) by equation (9), growth slows as baseline SPI rises;
iv) by Proposition 2, if baseline SPI is suﬃciently high, the economy will be caught
in a poverty trap.
In the following sections we test each of these predictions of the model.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 12
3 Construction of Socio-Political Instability
Indices
Human violence is arguably a universal phenomenon as it occurs throughout time
and across all social and political institutions. No form of government, whether
autocratic or democratic, appears immune from socio-political instability. Since SPI
subsumes both domestic conﬂicts as well as major government crises, we attribute SPI
to two types of political activities:i) violent and nonviolent antigovernment protests
and uprisings, and ii) violent and nonviolent actions undertaken by the government
to suppress protests and uprisings. Following Francisco (1996) and Gupta, Singh
and Sprague (1993), the construction of our indices also accounts for the possibil-
ity of interactive eﬀects between the government and agents who engage in SPI; in
some situations punitive government actions exacerbate demonstrations. This section
constructs a set of composite indicators reﬂecting diﬀerent types of SPI.12
For robustness, we estimate three SPI indices using two diﬀerent methods. The
ﬁrst SPI index is generated by estimating a logit equation relating major government
crises to domestic conﬂict events following Banks (1996).13 This measure of SPI
uses assassinations [ASSASS], guerrilla warfare [GUERWAR], purges, [PURGES],
general strikes [GSTRIKES], riots [RIOTS], and antigovernment demonstrations
[ANTIGOV DEM] as explanatory variables for the incidence of major government
crises, and is estimated using the following equation.
12Related methods to construct SPI indices are outlined in Gupta (1990), Ozler and Tabellini
(1991), Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992), and Alesina and Perotti (1996). All these SPI
indices are positively statistically correlated, but not identical.
13Appendix B describes of each of the variables used in the construction of the SPI indices. For
statistical superiority, we use a logit model instead of discriminant analysis; see Press and Wilson
(1978) for a discussion these issues. A more detailed description of SPI index construction is provided
in Le (1998), with data available at http://spe.cgu.edu/spedata/research.htm.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 13
SPIL = α0 + α1ASSASS + α2GSTRIKES + α3GUERWAR + α4PURGES
+ α5RIOTS + α6ANTIGOV DEM +  . (11)
All the estimated coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant indicating that the ex-
planatory variables raise the likelihood of SPI.14 The predicted values of equation
(11), which are continuous on (0,1), is our ﬁrst measure of SPI, SPIL.
Following Hibbs (1973), we use principal components analysis to generate two
alternative measures of SPI. Principal components analysis categorizes coincident
variation among a set of variables. This separates the types of SPI into discrete
dimensions producing two factors for SPI, denoted by SPIF1a n dSPIF2.15 The ﬁrst
factor, SPIF1, includes general strikes, riots, and anti-government demonstrations.
This factor captures collective protests. The second factor, SPIF2, includes purges,
guerrilla warfare, and assassinations. This factor captures violent uprisings. The
correlations of the ﬁrst measure, SPIL,w i t hSPIF1a n dSPIF2 are 0.57 and 0.79,
respectively.
4 Empirical Tests of the Model
4.1 Data and Sample Period
The data set consists of 58 countries over the period 1980-1995.16 The constraint
on the number of countries and initial year of coverage is the availability of data on
police expenditures. We utilize public order and safety expenditures from Government
Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFS) to measure police expenditures. Tax revenue and
14Table C1 in the Appendix reports the estimation results of the logit model.
15Table C2 in the Appendix contains the estimated principal components.
16There are 16 developed countries and there are 42 developing countries in the sample.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 14
public investment data are also taken from GFS.17 Data for GDP per capita, the
growth rate of GDP per capita, and the primary education enrollment rate are taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Government policy variables
are all measured as a proportion of GDP to control for scale eﬀects.
4.2 Empirical Evidence
We test the four implications of the model using panel data. Since panel data provides
more variation than cross-sectional analysis, the dynamic structure of the model is
more likely to be evident. In addition, growth regressions using panel data permit un-
observed country-speciﬁc heterogeneity.18 Generalized least squares (GLS) estimates
are reported for optimal policies and growth.
Table 1 presents the estimation of the optimal policy rules for public investment (5)
and police expenditures (6), with GDP per capita proxying the physical capital stock.
The coeﬃcients on GDP per capita in the police and public investment equations have
the predicted positive sign and are highly signiﬁcant. In addition, the adjusted R2s
are very near one showing that GDP per capita explains almost all of the variation
in these policies as the theory predicts. A 1% increase in GDP per capita results in a
0.09% increase in police expenditures. Furthermore, as the theory predicts, countries
provide more public investment as they grow: a 1% increase in GDP per capita is
associated with a 0.40% increase in public investment. This supports implication (i)
above.19
17Tax revenue data is contained in Table A: Revenue and Grants Consolidated Central Govern-
ment. Public investment data is listed under Table B: Expenditure by Function, Consolidated Cen-
tral Government. There are 14 categories in Table B, and we use education, health, social security
and welfare, and transportation and communication as the constituents of public investment.
18See Durlauf and Quah (1998) for an excellent survey of growth empirics using panel data.
19Dividing the data into developed and developing countries and estimating each policy separately,
tests for diﬀerences in estimated coeﬃcients reveal at the 1% signiﬁcance level, developing countriesOptimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 15
[Table 1 here]
Next, we test the model’s predictions relating SPI to growth using panel regres-
sions with each SPI index described above. We estimate a log-linear approximation
of (8) where SPI enters the growth equation directly and output proxies capital. The
regressions control for primary education enrollment rates as well as initial per capita
GDP.20
Table 2A shows that two of the three SPI measures have negative and signiﬁcant
impacts on growth revealing support for implication (iii). SPIF1, which measures
strikes and demonstrations, has a negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
growth. This indicates that violent uprisings (SPIF2), not collective protests, are
the aspect of SPI that has the strongest impact on the economy. Moreover, the
estimation results indicate that SPI has a substantial quantitative eﬀect on growth:
a1 %i n c r e a s ei nSPIL decreases annual per capita output growth by 0.44%, while a
1% increase in SPIF2 has nearly twice this impact.
As the theory predicts, public investment has a positive, highly statistically signif-
icant, and quantitatively relevant impact on growth in all three speciﬁcations. A 1%
increase in public investment increases annual per capita output growth by 0.70%.
Conversely, taxes have a negative and signiﬁcant impact on growth. A 1% increase
in taxes decreases annual per capita output growth by just under 0.70% in each
speciﬁcation – interestingly roughly the same elasticity for public investment.
The third government policy the theory predicts aﬀects economic growth is police
spending. Since the optimality conditions (5) and (6) show that public investment
and police expenditures are collinear, we drop public investment from equation (3)
spend less on police but more on public investment as income rises than do developed countries.
20We use three lags for the control variables primary education enrollment rate and initial GDP
to instrument these potentially endogenous variables. An F-test indicates that there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between using one, two or three lags.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 16
and replace it with police expenditures. For this speciﬁcation, reported in column (4)
of Table 2B, and utilizing the measure of violent uprisings, SPIF2, the estimated
coeﬃcient on police expenditures is positive but insigniﬁcant. The same result obtains
for the other measures of SPI. This suggests that police expenditures may have other
uses besides securing public order and thus are only weakly related to growth in this
sample.
The ﬁnal estimation investigates the existence of an SPI-caused poverty trap. Re-
call that the theory demonstrates that SPI has only a small impact on developed
countries but can be quite pernicious in poor countries. We therefore examine coun-
tries that have SPI 20% above the mean, using the measure of SPI that has the largest
impact on growth from the full sample, that being the measure of violent uprisings,
SPIF2. We re-estimate growth equation (3) for the sample of 18 countries with high
SPI, as reported in Table 2B column (5). The coeﬃcient on SPI doubles in size and
remains highly signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, public investment for these countries has a
large negative and signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcient, while the estimated coeﬃcient on
education is also large, positive, and signiﬁcant. Most importantly, the estimated
coeﬃcient on initial GDP becomes insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. Thus, when
SPI is high, countries lose the growth advantage from being poor. This is indirect
evidence for implication (iv) of the theory, the existence of a poverty trap.
The results in this section taken as a whole show solid support for the theory
relating SPI and government policy to growth.
[Table 2 here]
4.3 Growth Regressions: Robustness Tests
The preceding section estimated the growth equation derived directly from the model.
More generally, the impact of political variables on economic growth has been inves-
tigated following the approach introduced by Barro (1991). Barro-style growth re-Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 17
gressions control for a set of variables presumed to aﬀect the rate of economic growth
including inﬂation, population growth, and terms-of-trade. In this section, we re-
estimate our growth regressions using additional control variables to investigate the
robustness of our results. Data for inﬂation, population growth, and terms-of-trade
(measured by the growth rate of the ratio of export prices to import prices) are taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
The estimation results reported in Table 3 conﬁrm the ﬁndings in the preceding
section. Two of the three SPI measures continue to have negative and signiﬁcant
impacts on growth with the additional controls. Further, the coeﬃcients of the sig-
niﬁcant SPI measures increase compared to the preceding results: a 1% increase in
SPIL decreases annual per capita growth by 0.48%, while a 1% increase in SPIF2
decreases growth by almost 1%. As above, the collective protests variable (SPIF1)
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Also supporting the previous results, public invest-
ment has a positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant impact on growth with each
of the three SPI measures, while taxes are negative and signiﬁcant. With the addi-
tional controls, the elasticity of taxes on growth is about three times the elasticity for
public investment. Lastly, the control variables all have the expected signs and are
statistically signiﬁcant: inﬂation and population growth are negative and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level; terms-of-trade is positive and signiﬁcant at 5% or better.
[Table 3 here]
4.4 Estimation of ω and η, and Simulations of Growth
Trajectories
Our next task is to estimate ω and η in order to examine the model’s predictions for
the slope of economy’s growth trajectory. Recall that by Corollary 1, the dynamics
of the economy are determined by the relative values of the marginal eﬃciency of theOptimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 18
police at reducing SPI, ω, and the sensitivity of SPI to income equality, η.T a k i n g
logs of equation (1) produces the estimable equation
ln(1 − πt)=D0 + ω ln(Pt) − ηln(τt), (12)
where D0 ≡ ln(D)i sac o n s t a n t .
Table 4 reports the estimation of ω and η via (12) using each measure of SPI
to generate a measure of socio-political stability,1− π. In two of the three cases,
ω<η , indicating that optimal policies and output growth are generally concave for
the average country. The exception occurs when (12) is estimated using SPIF1. As
in the growth regressions above, we discount this result as SPIF1 does not appear
to capture the impact of SPI on the economy well. The estimation results show that
political stability is relatively sensitive to both police expenditures and taxes. Using
the average estimated value of η, a 10% increase in taxes causes political stability to
decrease by 0.13%. On the other hand, a 10% increase in police expenditures raises
political stability by 0.12%.
[Table 4 here]
Next, we determine the growth path induced by the estimated government policies
for police spending and public investment found above. We do this by simulating
the economy’s dynamics via the capital market equilibrium condition (9) using the
average estimates of ω and η from Table 4, ω =0 .0122 and η =0 .0125. Additional
parameter values in (9) are: savings rate, s =0 .10, capital depreciation rate, δ =0 .10;
capital’s share of output, α =0 .40 (Cooley, 1995).
Figure 2 shows that optimal policies result in quasi-AK growth for an economy
with low baseline SPI (D =0 .95). Increasing the marginal eﬃciency of the police, ω,
shifts the line upward, while increasing the sensitivity of SPI to inequality, η, shifts the
line downward, toward the 45 degree line. Thus, supporting and extending predictionOptimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 19
(ii), the model shows that optimal policies that internalize their eﬀect on SPI result
in near balanced growth in the transitional dynamics with concave production and
absent technological change.
Figure 3 also displays the economy’s growth path when baseline SPI is high (D =
0.10). As before, a quasi-AK growth also obtains, but in this case growth is negative
and the economy contracts to a poverty trap. Raising the marginal eﬃciency of the
police, ω, does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the growth path; in particular, for
high levels of SPI, positive growth is unattainable even with an eﬀective police force.
On the other hand, increasing the sensitivity of SPI to inequality, η, shifts the line
further downward, while decreasing it shifts the line upward.
[Figure 2 here]
The simulations show that countries with high levels of SPI cannot escape a
poverty trap – even with optimal government policies that take into account SPI.
Put diﬀerently, public investment alone is not enough to generate endogenous growth
when taxes raise SPI: both the maintenance of public order and public investment are
required for poor countries to successfully develop.
4.5 SPI, Ethnicity, and Inequality
In the theory and empirics, SPI was deﬁned independent of its relation to ethnicity, yet
there are many examples of ethnic strife fomenting violence as discussed in Bardhan
(1997), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Rodrik (2000). Bates (2000) shows that
there are “inﬂection points” where protest escalates into ethnic violence. As a further
robustness test of our theory, in this section we explore the direct role of ethnicity
and income inequality at generating SPI by estimating an augmented version of the
determinants-of-SPI-equation (1).Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 20
The SPI relation (1) is estimated using both collective protests, SPIF1, and
violent uprisings, SPIF2, along with a new variable ETHNIC which measures
ethno-linguistic fractionalization.21 We also use a direct measure of income inequality,
GINI, from Deininger and Squire (1996) rather than use the indirect measure, taxes,
used earlier. Following Bates (2000) we enter ETHNIC as a quadratic. Lastly, we
also control for policy choices as Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnically di-
vided countries have trouble implementing public policies. For this reason, we include
the two public policies from the model, police expenditures and public investment,
in the estimation of (1). Policies are lagged to control for the endogeneity identiﬁed
in the theory. Lastly, lagged GDP and primary education enrollment are included as
controls.
Table 5 reports the estimation results. Ethnic divisions have a substantial im-
pact on SPI, especially on collective protests. Column 2 in Table 5 shows that the
linear coeﬃcient on ETHNIC has positive and signiﬁcant impact on SPIF1( c o l -
lective protests), and its squared term is also positive and signiﬁcant. This indicates
that collective protests increase at an increasing rate as ethnic divisions rise. In-
come inequality also has the expected positive impact on collective protests and is
highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on police expenditures is negative and signiﬁcant,
consistent with the theory, while the coeﬃcient on public investment is insigniﬁcant.
Column 3 in Table 5 shows that ethnic divisions are also associated with fewer
violent uprisings. The linear coeﬃcient on ETHNIC has a negative and signiﬁcant
impact on SPIF2, while its squared term is also negative and signiﬁcant. Thus,
violent revolts strictly decrease as ethnic divisions intensify in this sample, unlike the
inﬂection points found by Bates (2000), though similar to the ﬁndings of Bardhan
21We utilize the same measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization as Easterly and Levine (1997)
and many others, from Atlas Norodow Mira (Moscow:Miklukho-Maklai Ethnological Institute at the
Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the Soviet Union,
1964).Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 21
(1997). The coeﬃcient on income inequality remains positive and is signiﬁcant at
better than 1%, consistent with the theory. As we ﬁnd with collective protests, the
coeﬃcients on police expenditures and public investment are negative with only the
former being signiﬁcant.
[Table 4 here]
These results show that the government policy model (2)-(4) has ignored an impor-
tant factor aﬀecting SPI, ethnic divisions. We leave it for future research to examine
the role of government policy in reducing ethnic uprisings. Nevertheless, the totality
of the empirics show robust support for the role of public policy aimed at reducing
SPI as part of the process of economic development.
5 Conclusions
The model of optimal policy-setting in a growing economy presented in this paper
shows that raising taxes to fund policies may have an unintended eﬀect – raising
SPI. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically that even when government policy
takes into account its impact on SPI, for example funding policies to directly reduce
SPI, positive growth still may not occur. Simulating the model using the estimated
coeﬃcients for optimal government policies demonstrates that a typical country will
grow on a quasi-linear trajectory in the transitional dynamics as long as the baseline
level of SPI is not too high. In the long run, all countries with positive growth are
predicted to reach a balanced growth path, while economies that are contracting will
continue to do so absent outside intervention.
The primary lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that government development
policy is seldom neutral vis-` a-vis SPI. Policies meant to stimulate the economy can
signiﬁcantly impact a country’s growth trajectory, indicating the delicate balance that
governments in developing countries face when setting policy.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 22
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A: Optimal Policy without SPI
Consider the case when the capital stock is so high (Kt ≥ κ) that there is no SPI
(π = 0), and police spending is therefore constant (Pt = P(κ) > 0 for all t such that











t − τt]+( 1− δ)Kt (14)
τt = λt + P(κ). (15)
The solution to (13)-(15) is λ 
t =( 1− α)
1
αKt,a n dτ 
t = λ 
t + P(κ). Note that
these are linear in K. Embedding these optima into a constant savings rate growth
produces an AK model,
Kt+1 =[ sα(1 − α)
1−α
α +1− δ]Kt − sP(κ).
As long as the savings rate is not too low, s> δ
α(1−α)
1−α
α ,a n dKt >s P(κ), balanced
endogenous growth obtains.
This derivation shows the marked diﬀerence that optimal policies have on the
dynamics of developing versus developed economies: optimal policy in developing
economies produces various growth paths depending on local factors, while in devel-
oped economies optimal policy always results in balanced growth.Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 23
6.2 Appendix B: Description of Variables Used to
Construct SPI Indices
We use Banks’ (1996) data set on domestic conﬂict events to construct the SPI indices.
A sample of 142 countries are included in the data set, of which, 57 countries have
data available for the entire period 1948-1995. Banks does not include years prior
to a country’s independence, and many countries begin to have records on domestic
conﬂicts only several years after gaining independence. For this reason, the data for
many countries begin after 1948.
The following domestic conﬂict variables are included in the data set. Banks uses
the variable deﬁnitions from Rummel (1963). These deﬁnitions are:
• Assassinations [ASSASS]: Any politically motivated murder or attempted mur-
der of a high government oﬃcial or politician.
• General Strikes [GSTRIKES]: Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service
workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national
government policies or authority.
• Guerrilla Warfare [GUERWAR]: Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombing
carried out by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at
the overthrow of the present regime.
• Purges [PURGES]: Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of po-
litical opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.
• Riots [RIOTS]: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens
involving the use of physical force.
• Anti-Government Demonstrations [ANTIGOV DEM]: Any peaceful public
gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicingOptimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 24
their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations
of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.
6.3 Appendix C: Estimation Results for the SPI Indices
Using the Logit Model and Principal Components
Analysis
[Table C1 here]
[Table C2 here]Optimal Policy and Socio-Political Instability 25
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ADJUSTED R-SQUARED  0.997  0.955 
NO. OF PANEL OBSERVATIONS  578  578 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** Statistically significant at 
the 1% level.   
 Table 2. Per Capita Growth Rate and SPI  
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LN(SPIF1)   -0.072 
(0.102) 
 
































ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  0.437 0.431 0.441 
NO. OF PANEL OBSERVATIONS  364  364  364 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** Statistically significant at 
the 1% level. * Statistically significant at the 5% level.   
 Table 2 (Continued) 
 
TABLE 2B 


























NO. OF PANEL OBSERVATIONS  364  112 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED  0.451  0.700 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** Statistically significant at 




 Table 3. Per Capita Growth Rate and SPI: Further Tests  
 




LN(SPIF1)   0.026 
(0.121) 
 


















































ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  0.489 0.478 0.519 
NO. OF PANEL OBSERVATIONS  323  323  323 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** Statistically significant at 
the 1% level. * Statistically significant at the 5% level.   Table 4. Estimation of ω  and η  
 
PARAMETER  ω   η  
STABL 0.0109**  0.0164** 
STABF1 0.0215*  0.0099 
STABF2 0.0042  0.0111** 
AVERAGE 0.0122  0.0125 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** Statistically significant at 







































 Table 5. SPI, Ethnicity, and Inequality  
 


































ADJUSTED R-SQUARED  0.102  0.014 
NO. OF PANEL OBSERVATIONS  138  138 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.*** Statistically significant at 
the 1% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. * Statistically significant at the 10% level.   
 Table C1. Logit Estimation Results of SPI 
 









CONSTANT -2.1822*  0.0443  2422.7568  0.0001 
ASSASS 0.1557*  0.0351  19.6826  0.0001 
GSTRIKES 0.5266*  0.0604  76.0393  0.0001 
GUERWAR 0.3583*  0.0527  46.2777  0.0001 
PURGES 0.3519*  0.0468  56.5297  0.0001 
RIOTS 0.0790*  0.0220  12.9245  0.0003 
ANTIGOVDEM 0.0266  0.0213  1.5592  0.2118 
Notes: N1, N0 pairs=5069200, -2 log likelihood=423.074 with 6 DF (p=0.0001), Concordant/Discordant 
(%)=66.5/18.1.  * Statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  The criterion for significance is the Wald Chi-
Square. Table C2. Principal Components Analysis of SPI  
 
STANDARDIZED SCOING COEFFICIENTS 
VARIABLE  SPI FACTOR 1  SPI FACTOR 2 
ASSASS 0.09013  0.27712 
GSTRIKES  0.26878  0.09436 
GUERWAR -0.06418  0.60154 
PURGES -0.10442  0.55828 
RIOTS  0.48578  -0.06464 
ANTIGOVDEM  0.49074  -0.12342 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY EACH FACTOR 
SPI FACTOR 1  SPI FACTOR 2 
1.989431 1.179004 
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Figure 1. Growth Paths of an Economy with SPI 
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Figure 2. Growth Paths of an Economy with Low and High Base SPI 